

February 25, 1948

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S/S - Fr. Humelsine To:

I am returning hr. Porrestal's memorandum which you gave me on February 20, and I do not believe that an answer is required. In order that the Secretary may be prepared to discuss the matter if Mr. Forrestal should raise the subject in the near future -- as indicated in the last paragraph of his memorandum -- I am forwarding herewith a memorandum for the Secretary embodying our views on Ur. Forrestal's suggestions.

I discussed this subject generally with the Secretary on February 12, after clearing it with Ir. Lovett, and provided him with a memorandum dated February 11, a copy of which is also attached.

It is, of course, possible that Mr. Forrestal will not bring this matter up. I believe the Armed Services are making a concerted effort to persuade him that his procedural suggestions are not the proper solution to the problem.

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February 25, 1948

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To:

The Secretary

Subject:

Mr. Formestal's Memorandum re the Proposed New Charter for the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB).

Discussion:

Mr. Forrestal's position -- that the National Security Council is the proper appellate body for the resolution of matters which might not be solved at the USII3 level -- is identical with the position of the Department's representatives throughout the negotiations, and those representatives agree with Ir. Forrestal on this point even though they accepted a compromise to avoid a complete deadlock.

The Department's representatives also agree with Ir. Forrestal that an Executive Order is not necessary to attain the current objective of stabilizing the status of USCIB, although they feel that an executive order would be desirable in order to maintain authoritative control over communications intelligence security.

Mr. Forrestal's procedural suggestions indicate (a) that the matter has been viewed as one involving the problem of operational control of the communications intelligence effort; and (b) that the valid solution to such a problem requires specific exercise of CIA authority through issuance of a CIA directive. The Department's representatives cannot concur with that portion of Mr. Forrestal's memorandum for the following reasons:

(1) Mr. Forrestal's suggestions, if adopted, would introduce machinery for the solution of a non-existent problem. USCIB is in fact an operating interdepartmental agency solely concerned with the management and coordination of communications intelligence security and production, both technologically and substantively.

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The problem at hand is to regularize the membership of USCIB--whose original charter does not recognize the added members--and to restate the authority of the Board so as to conform with the National Security Act.

(2) Mr. Forrestal's suggestions omit consideration of the fact that the production and evaluation of communications intelligence are almost exclusively tactically nature and seldom, if ever, are strategic. Consequently, the technological management which is indispensable to the conduct of communications intelligence activities is a responsibility to be borne primarily by the producing agencies. Mr. Forrestal's suggestions, if adopted as now stated, would result in an apparent unification of tactical military and naval activities under the direction of a non-military group which was created primarily for the handling of strategic intelligence.


In lieu of Mr. Forrestal's procedural suggestions, it is the view of the Department's representatives that the objectives sought through the proposed charter can best be attained by having the National Security Council issue to the member departments and agencies of USCIF an Intelligence Directive which would incorporate substantially the agreedupon provisions of the charter, but would substitute the National Security Council as the appellate body in place of the body presently named in the charter.

The Department's representatives also feel that the regularizing of USITE is not an appropriate matter for consideration by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee, whose primary responsibility, it is understood, is to examine the operations of CIA. On the other hand, it would seem most appropriate for that Committee to conduct its examination of CIA communications intelligence activities in relation to the existing inter-departmental effort in that field.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that

(1) You urge Mr. Forrestal to accept the procedure of having the National Security Council issue to the member departments and agencies of TSCIB an Intelligence Directive which would incorporate substantially the agreed-upon provisions of the charter, but would substitute the National Security Council as the appellate body in place of the body presently named in the charter.





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(2) In the event that Mr. Forrestal is unable to accept this solution, you reject his procedural suggestions and reaffirm the compromise already accepted by the Department's representatives and discussed with you on February 12, 1948.

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

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WEMORANDUM

To:

The Secretary

Subject: Proposed New Charter for the UNITED STATES COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE BOARD/USCIF).

Discussions


The U.S. Communication Intelligence Board was founded in Earth 1945 as the Army-Mary Communication Intelligence Board (AMCIB) by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. Subsequently the Department of State joined the Board (and is represented thereon by Sa-A) and later the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the name changed to the present one. The original charter does not recognize the added members, and, in view of the responsibilities in the communication intelligence field which they have assumed, the Board has feit that its membership should be regularized and its authorities restated to conform with the Estional Security Act of 1967. The Board has for several months been considering the provisions of a new charter which would (a) establish it within the Executive Branch as the appropriate cody responsible for certain functional powers, such as security of communication intelligence and the conduct of lisison in this field, (b) confirm the greatest membership of the Board and consolidate its accomplishments in the field of interdepartmental collaboration, and (c) establish as appellate body to resolve questions upon which the Board reaches an impasses

The Department's representatives in the negotiations took the position that the Board should report on stalemented questions to the Estimal Security Council for resolution; they were supported in this by CIA (the FEI having retired from the Board in September 1947). The Armed Services took the position that the Board should report such cases to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A complete deaclock in this issue could only be avoided by a compromise under which the Board will refer disputed questions to a body consisting of the Under Secretary of State and the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services.

Recommendations

That you approve the new charter for USCIB (attached as Tab A),—and the proposed Executive Order to be issued by the President (attached as Tab B), that you approve a memorandum for the President

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(copy attached as Tab C) and sign the original when it has been signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Armed Services.

Attachments:

Tab A Tab B Tab C Exhibit I (Chronological outline of the history of USCIB) Exhibit-II (Charter of ANCIB dated March 10, 1945) Exhibit III (Nemorandum from the President dated September 12, 1945) Exhibit IV (Hemorandum from Secretary Byrnes designating the Special Assistant as Departmental representative in communication intelligence, dated October 23, 1945) Exhibit V (Department of State membership in the Board dated December 20, 1945)

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

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I have just completed a study of the papers dealing with the establishment of the United States Communication Intelligence i. Suintentiably, I as in complete agreement with the objects which appears much to accomplish.

Procedurally, however, it seems to me that there is no most fur an inscript Order, in view of the very clear provisions of the Retional Security Act. I realism, of ourse, that the producesour board was established by Executive, but that event took place prior to the passage lished by Essenting Order, but that event took place prior to the pessage of the Setional Security Let.

In view of the scheegesmt passage of that Act - and expecially in view of the lenguage of section MOS of the Act, which deals with the Control Intelligence Agency - I feel that the objects desired can more appropriately to association by means of a Control Intelligence Agency directive.

I think that this precedure will work out satisfactorily from the standpoint of all conserved, since the Control Intelligence agency is, by contion NGC "established under the Rational Society Council", and since all of the Expertments which are to be members of the United States Communication Establishment Foundation already numbers of the Hotismal

It is my balial, therefore, that the substantive results on-y the subject papers one best be accomplished in the precederal vintesed by the misjoot possess. of Min is done, the National Security Souncil will itself easthibute a group which one receive any matters which are not decided at a lover level.

I expect to distant this matter with the Secretary of State in the near Science and would appreciate any expects you say here in T also suggest that this would be an appropriate matter for consideration by the Dulles-Jackson-Corren lumnithes which is to examine the operations of CIA.

Forestal

cc: Secretary of State - Care Forestal Director, C.I.A.

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